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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nestor Sanchez appeals, prose, from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Sanchez was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen, based on committing sexual acts upon his step-daughter, M.D., when she was
between nine and thirteen years of age. (#32181 R., 1 pp.16-17.) After the first day of
trial the parties entered into a plea agreement whereby Sanchez pied guilty to Count II
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), and the state dismissed the
remaining two counts. (#32181 R., pp.23, 114-121; #32181 Tr. of 12/8/04, p.1, L16 p.2, L.3; p.11, Ls.21-23.)
At a status hearing prior to the sentencing date, Sanchez's attorney advised the
court that Sanchez wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, and following a hearing, the court
denied that motion. (#32181 R., pp.150-153; #32181 Tr. of 2/17/05 passim.) Sanchez
filed a "Renewed Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea" (#32181 R., pp.174-176), which
motion was considered and denied at his sentencing hearing (#32181 R., pp.187-190;
#32181 Tr. of 6/20/05, p.55, L.23 - p.56, L.18). The district court then entered judgment
and imposed a unified sentence of twenty years with ten years fixed for Sanchez's
commission of one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.
pp.193-194.)

(#32181 R.,

Sanchez filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which was

1

On April 26, 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record
and Reporter's Transcript in Sanchez's underlying criminal case, State v. Sanchez,
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. #32181. (4/26/12 Order Taking Judicial Notice.)
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denied. (R., p.346.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Sanchez's conviction and
sentence. State v. Sanchez, Docket No. 32181, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 593
(Idaho App., Sept. 25, 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court denied Sanchez's petition for
review. (R., p.346.)
The district court explained the subsequent proceedings as follows:
On December 15, 2008, Petitioner Nestor Sanchez filed a pro se
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, together with his supporting affidavit.
He sought the representation of court-appointed counsel, which motion
was granted by the court by the order filed December 15, 2008, appointing
the Law Office of Mark Mimura to represent the Petitioner in this action.
The Respondent State of Idaho on May 15, 2009, filed its Answer,
together with its Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief;
the Affidavit of Kevin Burnett; a Motion for the Court to Take Judicial
Notice of Documents Pursuant to IRE 201; and a Motion for Release of
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report. By orders filed May 26, 2009, the
court granted the motion for judicial notice of certain documents and the
motion for release of the pre-sentence report.
Delay occurred in the processing of this case in part because
Petitioner Sanchez sought to disqualify Gem County Public Defender
Mark Mimura as having a conflict. The court conducted a hearing and
determined that in fact no conflict existed so as to disqualify Mr. Mimura
from representation of Petitioner Sanchez. However, in an effort to
promote confidence by Mr. Sanchez in his representation, Mr. Mimura
offered to assign another attorney from his office to represent Petitioner in
this case. Later, Mr. Sanchez filed another Motion to Disqualify Counsel
as ineffective, stemming seemingly from Mr. Sanchez's dissatisfaction
with the amount of communication he was having with counsel. However,
those issues with communication were thereafter resolved by Mr. Sanchez
on the court record.
(R., pp.346-347.)

2

The district court entered an "Order on State's Motion for Summary Dismissal"
(R., pp.344-373) summarily dismissing Sanchez's petition, and a Judgment of Dismissal
(R., pp.374-375). Sanchez filed a timely appeal. 2 (R., pp.389-390.)

The SAPD was originally appointed to represent Sanchez on appeal, but withdrew
because, after advising him of the results of their review of the case, Sanchez "indicated
his desire to proceed pro se." (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Withdraw
and Allow Appellant to Proceed Pro Se, p.1.)
2
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ISSUES
Sanchez states the issues on appeal as:
1.

District Court committed error by refusing Petitioner a Evidentiary
Hearing.

2.

By Post-Conviction Counsel Providing Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, The Petitioner/appellant was and continues to be deprived
of his Constitutional Right's.

3.

District Court allowed a Conflict of Interest to continue In violation of
the petitioner/appellant's Constitutional Right to effective assistance
of counsel.

(Appellant's Brief, p.2 (verbatim).)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Sanchez failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Sanchez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
In its order granting the state's motion for summary dismissal, the district court

reviewed each of Sanchez's numerous claims and determined none of them had any
merit.

(R., pp.344-373.)

Sanchez's claims included:

(1) ineffective assistance of

counsel "in regard to the early representation by Mr. Alegria or the trial/change of plea
representation by Mr. Meinhoffer" (R., p.354); (2) seventeen additional claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel (R., pp.354-367); (3) four claims of inadequate
counsel "caused by the court" (R., pp.367-369); (4) five claims of ineffective assistance
by appellate counsel (R., pp.369-370); and (5) five claims of violations of his state and
federal constitutional rights (R., pp.370-371).
On appeal, Sanchez argues: (1) the district court erred by refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing; (2) his post-conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance; and
(3) the district court allowed a conflict of interest between appointed counsel and
Sanchez to exist. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-7.) Sanchez's arguments on appeal fail. He
has not shown that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction
relief petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's application of

the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190,
30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction

5

petition, the appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of
material fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant
to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999).
Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards
v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164
P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an

ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain statement of
the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at
522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).

The petitioner must submit verified facts within his

personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
(citing I.C. § 19-4903).

kl

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief

application must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v.
State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative.

"To

withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
6

establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278,
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 194906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each
element of petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C.
§ 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must

accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). If the alleged
facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required
to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition. 19.:_ (citing Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved
by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

D.

Sanchez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Sanchez has failed to establish error in the court's summary dismissal of his

petition for post-conviction relief. In its Order on State's Motion for Summary Dismissal
(R., pp.344-373), the district court articulated the applicable legal standards and set

forth, in detail, the reasons Sanchez failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
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on any of his claims. The state adopts the district court's written opinion as its argument
on appeal, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. In addition to the grounds
set forth in the district court's order, this Court should refuse to consider Sanchez's
appellate issues for the following reasons.
Sanchez first argues on appeal that the district court erred by refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction claims.

After Sanchez mentions a lack of

communication and resulting conflict with his post-conviction counsel, and that Sanchez
had to file a pro-se motion for (unspecified) transcripts of recordings "which support his
claim of factual innocence," Sanchez argues:
The petitioner/appellant alleges that the record reflects enough
factual evidence, that the Court errored in denial of a Evidentiary Hearing.
In this case, had the Court allowed a Evidentiary Hearing, the
petitioner/appellant would have shown the Court a recording which show's
the alleged victim (MD) was not being honest and also that evidence did
not match medical records provided by the State.
All through the record, the petitioner/appellant mentions how this
recording, along with transcripts, prove that (MD) made allegations against
the Petitioner/appellant which were not true. Here at the Court's door is a
man who screams to the Court, "I am innocent and evidence exist that will
prove this.
By the Court's denial of a Evideniary Hearing, the
petitioner/appellant was and continues to be deprived of his Constitutional
Rights of the United States and prejudiced the petitioner/appellant ....
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-5 (verbatim).)
Sanchez's first issue is insufficient for this Court to review. On appeal, the Court
will not presume error. Claims not supported by "cogent argument" or citations of
authority will not be reviewed. State v. Phillips, 118 Idaho 27, 29, 794 P.2d 297 (Ct.
App. 1990). Sanchez's argument on appeal is not cogent; he fails to disclose what
recording and transcripts he is referring to, what was said in them, and how they might
8

show he is innocent. Additionally, because Sanchez has failed to specifically challenge
the district court's grounds for summary dismissal and refusal to grant an evidentiary
hearing, he has necessarily failed to present argument, authority, or both, in regard to
any such issue, and the contention raised in his Appellant's Brief should not be
considered on appeal. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996), "A party waives an issue cited on appeal
if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." Id. at 263, 923
P.2d at 970.
Sanchez's second issue on appeal - ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel -- fares no better than his first issue. As a matter of law, a claim of ineffective
assistance by post-conviction counsel is not an independent ground for a subsequent
post-conviction proceeding. Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 198, 832 P.2d 1131, 1133
(1992); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("the right to
appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further"). Post-conviction
proceedings are civil in nature. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986).
The constitutional right to counsel applies only in criminal actions. Idaho Const. art. 1, §
13; U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)
("There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.
Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
in such proceedings.").

In short, this Court should decline to consider the merits of

Sanchez's second issue on appeal because he had no constitutionally protected right to
the effective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction proceeding.
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In Sanchez's third issue on appeal, he complains that, on April 1, 2010, when he
advised the district court that he had a conflict of interest (based on lack of
communication) with his post-conviction counsel, the district court reassigned another
attorney from the same firm to represent him. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) According to
Sanchez, by assigning the case to another attorney in the same law firm, "[t]his conflict
still existed so therefore counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, due to this
conflict." (Id.) However, "[t]he doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from
asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error."
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)).

"One may not

complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 Idaho at 187,
254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985);
State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). A review of
the record in this case shows that Sanchez cannot complain about the representation
by the second member of the law firm that was assigned to his post-conviction case
because, in the end, he agreed to be represented by him despite the alleged past
communication problems.
On November 12, 2010, Sanchez filed a Motion and Affidavit to Disqualify
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in which he alleged that his newly assigned attorney
(i.e., the second attorney from the same law firm) had neglected to communicate with
him. (R., pp.309-311.) However, according to the minutes of the court log of a status
hearing held April 25, 2011, Sanchez (telephonically present) told the court he "would
like to keep his attorney but that the attorney needs to communicate better with him."

10

(R., p.325.) A couple minutes later, the court asked Sanchez "if he was going to keep
the attorney," and Sanchez "stated that he was." (Id.) Based on the court's log of that
status hearing, Sanchez no longer wanted a different attorney, and his request to
disqualify him was effectively terminated. Therefore, Sanchez's claim of error in the
continued representation by the second member of the law firm fails under the invited
error doctrine.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered upon
the district court's order summarily dismissing Sanchez's petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 1yth day of April, 2013.

C. McKINNEY
uty Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1th day of April, 2013, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
NESTOR SANCHEZ #78322
ICC/CCA
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

JCM/pm
11

APPENDIX A

; ·i:.,.
·,;;,.

jj:.-

_F__
1.~M.

'

ii

OCT O5 2011

I

l

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

!

I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

NESTOR SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2008-884

ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

This matter having come before the court for hearing on June 27, 2011, upon the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed May 15, 2009; and the Petitioner having been represented
by Mr. Casey Swensen, Mimura Law Offices, PLLC, Gem County Public Defender; and the
Respondent having been represented by Mr. Timothy McNeese, Gem County Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney; and the court having considered the arguments of counsel; the file and
record in this action; the record and proceedings in Gem County Case No. CR-2004-1235, State

of Idaho vs. Nestor Sanchez, of which the court has taken judicial notice, as set forth in the Order
on Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice of Documents Pursuant to IRE 201, entered May 26,
2009; the applicable law; and the transcripts that have been submitted; this court does hereby
render its ruling as follows.

ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL-I

BACKGROUND

On December 8, 2004, in Gem County Case No. CR-2004-1235, Nestor Sanchez pled
guilty to one count of Lewd Conduct With a Minor Under Sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code
Section 18- I 508, with the offense date occurring within the year 2001. Two additional counts of
Lewd Conduct, involving the same victim, were dismissed in exchange for Sanchez's plea of
guilty. No other agreements were made concerning the sentencing recommendations to be made
to the court. On January 28, 2005, defense counsel caused to be filed a Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea, together with the Affidavit of Sanchez in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea. On February 16, 2005, the Stated filed its opposition to Sanchez's motion, which matter
came before the trial court for hearing on February 17, 2005. The court denied Sanchez's
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation
report. The case again came before the court for hearing on April 25, 2005, upon Sanchez's
Motion for Order to Allow Tape Recording of Presentence Investigation Interview. At the time
set for hearing the trial court noted Sanchez's ability to understand the proceedings and the
parties agreed that the interview for the presentence investigation report would take place with
the deputy court clerk recording the interview. The court rescheduled sentencing for June 20,
2005. On June 20, 2005, counsel for Sanchez filed a Renewed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
together with a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The trial judge considered the
testimony of several defense witnesses in support of the Renewed Motion to Withdraw and
denied the motion. The matter then proceeded to sentencing. Nestor Sanchez was sentenced to a
unified term of twenty (20) years, with ten (10) years determinate. The Judgment and
Commitment reflecting that sentence was entered on June 23, 2005. On August 3, 2005,
Sanchez timely filed a Notice of Appeal and requested appointment of counsel. By an Order

ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL--2
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entered August 8, 2005, the State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent Sanchez
on appeal. A Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 was filed on
October 3 I, 2005. An Order denying Rule 35 relief was entered on March 1, 2006. The Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed Sanchez's conviction and denied the relief he requested in its 2007
Unpublished Opinion No. 593, State of Idaho v. Nestor Sanchez, filed September 25, 2007.
Sanchez's Petition for Review was denied on December 11, 2007, and a Remittitur was issued
on December 13, 2007.
On December 15, 2008, Petitioner Nestor Sanchez filed a pro se Petition for Post
Conviction Relief, together with his supporting affidavit. He sought the representation of courtappointed counsel, which motion was granted by the court by the order filed December 15, 2008,
appointing the Law Office of Mark Mimura to represent the Petitioner in this action. The
Respondent State of Idaho on May 15, 2009, filed its Answer, together with its Motion to
Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief; the Affidavit of Kevin Burnett; a Motion for the
Court to Take Judicial Notice of Documents Pursuant to IRE 20 I; and a Motion for Release of
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report. By orders filed May 26, 2009, the court granted the motion
for judicial notice of certain documents and the motion for release of the pre-sentence report.
Delay occurred in the processing of this case in part because Petitioner Sanchez sought to
disqualify Gem County Public Defender Mark Mimura as having a conflict. The court
conducted a hearing and determined that in fact no conflict existed so as to disqualify Mr.
Mimura from representation of Petitioner Sanchez. However, in an effort to promote confidence
by Mr. Sanchez in his representation, Mr. Mimura offered to assign another attorney from his
office to represent Petitioner in this case. Later, Mr. Sanchez filed another Motion to Disqualify
Counsel as ineffective, stemming seemingly from Mr. Sanchez's dissatisfaction with the amount

ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL--3
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of communication he was having with counsel. However, those issues with communication were
thereafter resolved by Mr. Sanchez on the court record.

APPLICABLE LAW
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature.

State. Bearshielcl, I 04 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,
830, 452, 54, 5 7 ( 1969); Murray v. State. 121 Idaho 918, 92 I, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (App. I 992).
However, it differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action because the application must
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits,
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. LC. § 19-4903. Thus,
the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. A verified pleading that sets forth
evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an
affidavit, and is accorded the same probative force as an affidavit. Camp v. Jimenez, I 07 Idaho
878,693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App. I 984).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief. either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to LC. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.
Summary judgment will be granted in a civil action when the litigant opposing the
motion fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

ORDER O~ STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL--4
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party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Bade!/ v. Beeks, 115 Idaho
101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988); Gar::.ee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337
(Ct.App.1992). As stated in Gar::ee:
Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish
a prima facie case. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of material
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Garzee, 121 Idaho at 774,828 P.2d at 337. This same standard governs motions for summary
dismissal of applications for post-conviction relief. If the applicant facing such a motion fails to
present evidence making a prima facie case, i.e., establishing each essential element of the claim,
then summary dismissal is appropriate. The applicant's factual showing must be based upon
evidence that would be admissible at hearing. An affidavit which is conclusory or based upon
hearsay is not sufficient. Drapeau v. State. 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 546,551
(Ct.App.1982). A conclusory allegation, not substantiated by any fact, is not sufficient to entitle
a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P .2d 705
(Ct.App.1988). Thus, an applicant for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Like a civil litigant resisting a
motion for summary judgment, an applicant opposing summary dismissal under I.C. § 19-4906
must present evidence to support every controverted element of the claim for relief. Griffith v.

State, 121 Idaho 371. 825 P.2d 94 (Ct.App.1992). If the applicant fails to present evidence
establishing an essential element on which he or she bears the burden of proof, summary
dismissal is appropriate.

The Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel includes the right to be
represented by rensonJbly competent counsel in an adequate fashion. Strickland v. Washington,
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466 U.S. 668, 685. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760 P.2d 1174 ( 1988); Huck v. State, l 24 Idaho 155, 857 P.2d 634 ( 1993). An accused is
entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious advocate. State v.
Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-

conviction procedure action. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient, and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency. Srrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, l 04 S.Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (l 984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316, 900 P.2d 221,224
(Ct.App.1995).
To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,
104 S.Ct. at 2064; Aragon v. Stare, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988).
To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon,
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell. 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656.
There is a strong presumption that defense counsel's performance falls within the wide
range of competent professional assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114
fdaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 ( 1988); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d
1323, 1327 (Ct.App.1992). Second, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been
different. Srricklund 466 U.S. at 694, l 04 S.Ct. at 2068; Parrott, 117 Idaho at 274-75, 787 P.2d
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at 260-61. This latter "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's deficient
perfonnance affected the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366,

370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 ( 1985). To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction claim must
sufficiently allege facts under both prongs of the test.
When a petitioner is convicted upon a plea of guilty, in order to satisfy the prejudice
element, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he or she would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v.

State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006).
Trial tactics and strategy choices are the province of trial counsel and will not be deemed
deficient in the absence of evidence that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the law or other objectively ascertainable shortcomings. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho
155, 857 P.2d 634 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,469, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026
(Ct.App.1991 ).
Rule 20 l (c), Idaho Rules of Evidence, provides that "A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts
from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court shall identify the specific documents
or items that were so noticed (emphasis supplied)." Rule 201(d), I.R.E., provides when the court
must take judicial notice: "When a party makes an oral or written request that a court take
judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate
case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is
requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties copies of such documents or items.
A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information."
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PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
Petitioner Nestor Sanchez claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to the following:
l)

Counsel failed to prepare pretrial motions for independent expert witnesses and
evaluations concerning:
A) Medical condition of the victim regarding sexual contact;
B) Evaluation of the victim's claims by a licensed professional;
C) A legnl psychological evaluation of the petitioner;

2)

Counsel failed to prepare pre-trial motions:

A) For production of exculpatory evidence;
B) For Miranda warning error during questioning;
C) Por su~pression of illegally obtained evidence without a warrant;
3)

Trial counsel failed to do:
A)
8)
C')
D)
E)
F)
G)

4)

Pre-trial research and/or give legal advice;
Secure a Translator~
Have tapes/CD's and videos transcribed;
Prepare for trial;
Investigate, locate, and/or interview witnesses;
Obtain the Medical and Examination Records of the Victim;
To conduct grand/petitjury selection properly;

Coun,el failed to research or investigate:
A) Law am1 facts of the case;
B) r_.c1w in relation to the plea:
C) Ddend::mt's Legal Claims;
D) That there was insufficient evidence to support the plea under Bailey;

5) Counsel failed to advise the Petitioner of:
A) .\deqw.1;e notice of the offense;
r3) . \vailabte options and possible consequences;
(') Cnmmunicate Gover.1ment's plea offer and assure the sentence promised;
f)) lripar.r r)f sentencing guidelines;
E) Serious risk of inability to withdraw plea;
6)

Counsel faikd to object to breach of plea;

7)

Counsel fJikd to offer cridence at trial:
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8) Counsd faih.:d to properly object to exclusion of the victim's prior sexual relations
and p-tttern of Ii:::,;
9)

Counsel failed to object to prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor;

10) Counsel failed to subject prosecution's case to meaningful adverse process;
11) Counsel misrepresented the plea agreement;
12) Counse! misrepresented material facts and withheld information;
13) Counsel induced plea based on:

Ambiguous plea agreement;
B) Coercion and threats;
C) Erroneous/faulty legal advice;
D) Lying to Defendant;
A)

14) Counsel coerced Petitioner and subjected him to duress ifhe did not plead guilty;
and admitted to his own coercion in open court;
15) Counsd verbally assaulted Defendant and used threats and racial comments;
16) Cou~1sel failed to investigate and object to false Presentence Report;

17) Cl1unsel failed re- provide adequate assistance at sentencing.
Petitioner Sanchez claims ineffective assistance of counsel, as caused by the court, as follows:
A) Interference with defense witnesses;
8) Failed to inquire into reasons why Defendant requested substitute counsel;
C) Court refused to allow Defendant to be present for an in camera hearing;
D) Refused to allow evidence of victim's behavior and related actions constituting lies
and fabrication 1Jf 1r::cusations toward authorities.

Petitioner Sanc!1ez claims thr. ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, as follows:

A) Apr,ellatc coun::;el failed to raise:
I) The m.~1:itoriou::; issues stated above:
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2) Obvious issues on appeal;
3) lneffecti,-..> ossistance of counsel:
4) Improper admission of false evidence and testimony;

5) Properly argue facts and law surrounding Appellant's federal constitutional right
~o withdr:nv plea 1.vhen asserting coercion and actual innocence, and submitting
the facts iwhicb were pro,·ided;
Petitioner Sanchez claims violations of his state and federal constitutional rights to:
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)

Due process;
Equa 1. prokction of Law:
Guarantee of proces<;es of the court in criminal actions;
Viol.Jtion of Fir,,t An1endme.it right to assert his innocence and facts;
Right to justice and speedy remedy vvithout adverse actions against his person, rights
and liberty intaest.

ANALYSIS
Timeliness
The Respondent State of Id1bo asserts that Sanchez's post-conviction petition is untimely
filed. Idaho Code Section l 9-4902(a) provides that a post-conviction proceeding must be filed
within one (I) year from the expiration of the time to appeal or from the determination of an
appeal or a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. The State contends that
Petitioner Sanchez missed the filing deadline by two (2) days, that the filing deadline is
jurisdictional, and that Petitioner's action should be dismissed, unless the court finds that an
exception applies, such as the mailbox rule. Alunsvn v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 642,917 P.2d 796

(I 996). The State points out that the Petitioner has made no showing that the petition itself was
delivered to prison authorities in a timely fashion for mailing to the Clerk of the Court. In
considering this issue. the court notes that the file reflects that at the time this petition was filed,
Sanchez was housed in a [)risen facility in the Stute of Texas. The petition was notarized by a
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notary public in Texas on December I 0. 2008, and Sanchez's Certificate of Service indicates that
it was sent on December 11. 2008. Although a certificate of service would certainly not be
dispositive, in this case the documents had to be sent from Littlefield, Texas, to Emmett, Idaho,
where they were filed at 9:00 a.m. on December 15, 2008. The record in this file suggests that in
order for the documents to have- arrived in Emmett for filing early on December 15, 2008, they
necessarily must have been submitted to prison authorities for mailing on or before December

13, 2008. Consequently, the court cannot conclude that the filing of Sanchez's post-conviction
petition was untimely.

fneffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
I)

Ineffective Counsel-Petitioner's claims against "counsel"

The Respondent State of Idaho argues that Petitioner has failed to identify any "counsel"
as the subject of his allegations except for Mr. Blender and thus no material issue has been raised
with regard to the early representation by Mr. Alegria or the trial/ change of plea representation
by Mr. Meinhoffer. The court agrees that the record produced by the Petitioner fails to state a
claim against either attorney and all claims must be dismissed as against them.

2) Ineffective Counsel Claims (1) through (17)
Claim No. I.
Counsel failed to prepare pretrial motions for independent expert witnesses and
evalmti0n,· corcerning:
i\-f,;di,:-nl condition of the victim reg.arding sexual contact;
B) Evaluation ot the victim's claims by a licensed professional;
C) A kg:il psychological evaluation of the petitioner.
A)

The Court 2grecs ,,.·ith the State's contention that Petitioner has not raised a material
factual issue with regard to the victim's medical condition and how such information wouJd
have affectt:LI his dt:'cisicr. r,, plt"·.id guilty Th~ record demonstrates that the Petitioner and his
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trial counsel had copies of the victim's medical examinations and Petitioner early on sought to
make the victim's prior sexual conduct an issue in the case. The CARES exam of the victim
that was conducted sh,mly after her disclosure stated that the physical exam was consistent
with the history tlut the victim had provided. Petitioner has not pointed to any admissible
facts relating to this issue that support a claim of ineffective assistance of his counsel.
Petitioner also alleges that counsel was ineffective in that the victim's claims were not
evaluated by a licensed professional. Petitioner's affidavit misstates the education and
credentials of one of the State's witnesses, but, additionally, he provides no admissible
evidence concerning how a different evaluation would have supplied a different result.
Finally, Petitioner claims that his attorney was ineffective in not requesting a psychological
evaluation of the Petitioner. Petitioner has produced no admissible evidence concerning how
the outcome would have been different, or that there was in fact an issue to be addressed. In
contrast, the court record reflects that the Petitioner had raised his emotional condition and/or
state of mind in relation to his claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty,
which request was denied by the trial judge and which decision was aflirmed on appeal.
Petitioner has faik<l to satisfy his burden on this issue.
Claim No. 2.
Counsel failed to prepare pre-trial motions:
D) For production of exculpatory evidence;
F.) Fnr :v1 inrndn warning error c.bi"ing questioning;
F) For suppression of illegally ohtained evidence without a warrant.
Petitioner has not made a factllal shov,·ing that any alleged "exculpatory evidence" existed or that
the State failed to pr,1duce it. It is clear from a review of the criminal case record and the
transcripts that botl1 defrn~e i:::01msel 3nd the Pc-ti1.ioner had in their possession medical reports,
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police reports, etc. In connection \vith his bid to withdraw his guilty plea, Petitioner Sanchez set
forth an impressive :;;r:isp l'f the evidence and the issues that he \ranted the jury to decide, despite
his having entered his p!ea of guilty on the second day of the jury trial. Sanchez has produced
nothing in support of his contention that somehow his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to
force production of unidentified "evidence." Likewise, Sanchez has failed to demonstrate a
factual basis for his contention that trial counsel erred by not seeking to suppress his statements
to law enforcement. The record before the court, in fact, supports a finding that Sanchez was not
in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings and Sanchez has not produced a factual record that
would support his claim that there was any illegally obtained evidence. A very significant piece
of evidence against Sanchez at trial was the confrontation phone call between the victim and
him. In connection with his change of plea, that confrontation phone call was discussed as
providing a factual basis for Sanchez's Afford plea, and the judge at sentencing also discussed
the contents of that confrontation phone call with Sanchez. Yet Sanchez has not demonstrated
any suppression issues regarding that phone call, or any other of the State's evidence against
him. Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden with regard to these claims.
Claim No. 3

0

Trial counsel failed to do:
H) Pre-trial research and/or give legal advice;

I;

S ectiri:· a Translator:

J)
Have tapes/CD's and videos transcribed;
K) Prepare for trial;
L) lnvesrigute, locak. and/or interview witnesses;
\1) Obtain '.he !\,1e.iical and Examination Records of the Victim;
N) To conduct graud/petitjury selection properly;

Petitioner's cla~m c0nceming failure by counsel "to do pre-trial research and/or give legal
advice" is concluso;:-y and is no! supported by facts. Additionally, the records disproves any
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contention that counsel was nut prepared to address the issues relating to Sanchez's defense.
Counsel for Defendant fileJ pre-trial motions. including a motion to permit examination
concerning the victim ·s prior ~exual conduct, which was denied by the court. However, counsel
successfully defended against the State's motion to establish a special procedure for the purpose
of providing the victim's testimony. The very thorough change of plea hearing also
demonstrated the extent of trial counsel's preparation and familiarity with the issues. In support
of this claim, Sanchez has failed to identify what "research" and/or "legal advice" was missing
and how the outcome wouJd have been different. Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance in
connection with the failure by counsel to insist on an interpreter for Sanchez. However, that
issue was thoroughly raised and determined by the presiding district judge in connection with
taking Sanchez's guilty plea and in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Sanchez has
not produced anything new. Sanchez has also fr1iled to submit admissible evidence concerning
how the transcription of any tapes, CD's, or videos would have assisted the defense. It is clear
from Sanchez's encyclopedic knowledge of the documentary and physical evidence against him
that he was well aware of the contents of any tapes. CD's, and/or videos and he has not sustained
his burden in demon:,trating how there \\as any ineffective assistance of counsel or any resulting
prejudice to him. Sanchez has not produced any legally admissible evidence to support a claim
that his counsel did not prepare for trial. The record of the pre-trial proceedings, the change of
plea transcript the record created in connection with Sanchez's attempt to withdraw his plea,
together with counsel's representation at the sentencing hearing, all reflect the thoroughness of
counsel's preparation. The trial judge. in accepting the plea, and then later in rejecting Sanchez's
attempt to \Vithdraw ii:. nude an extensive recorJ of counsel's preparation and efforts on behalf
of Mr. Sanchez. The cuurt finds that Sanchez has also failed to sustain his burden with regard to
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his claim that counsel failed :o investigate. locate, :111d/or interview \Vitnesses. In fact, the
Defendant's witness disclosures, together with the witness testimony that was adduced at the
sentencing hearing in support of the Defendant's renewed Motion to \Vithdraw Guilty Plea and
in mitigation of his s..:ntence, reflect the thoroughness of defense counsel's preparation as it
related to identilie:Ei)n of Sanchez's witnesses. Additionally, if there are additional witnesses,
Sanchez has failed to prodt,ce admissible evidence of what such witnesses might testify to.
Sanchez has also tailed to demonstrate an issue of fact concerning trial counsel's failure to obtain
the medical and examination records of the victim. The court record reflects that they were
disclosed, and that Sanchez throughout the underlying criminal case and in connection with this
post-conviction case has locused on these evaluations and medical reports. No additional or
undisclosed medical records have been identified in support of this claim, and there is no
contention presented here. and supported by admissible evidence, that the State had failed in its
obligation to disclose evidence. Finally, Sanchez complains that trial counsel failed to conduct
grand and petit_jury selection properly. As there was no grand jury indictment, the first part of
the claim is baseless and frivolous. Further, since Sanchez chose not to go forward with his jury
trial, after counsel and the cou11 had spent a day devoted to the selection of the jury, there is no
legitimate issue concerning the jury selection. Additionally, Sanchez has failed to articulate
anything other than a conclusory complaint about counsel's performance, thus providing no
factual support for a dairn rhm counsel's performance was deficient.

Counsel foi l<.:d to rescJrch or im·estigate:

[) L'.nv anJ focts of the case;
F) L1w in ~_..!(,_tion to the pica:
[k!\;11dant' s Legal Claims;
I I1 (hat !hrre was insutticient ev:.dence to support the plea under Bailey;

U)
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The co~u t ,1u:cs, ··tr '<~sp mdrnt'2 1rgL,mcnt ,ha, the r:cord in this case does not support
Sanchez's contention that his trial counsel failed to research the law and/or facts of the case.

Paradis v. State. l l O [daho 544.716 P.2d I 306 ( 1986). The transcripts, as well as the court
record and the contems of the Court of Appeals opinion affirming the district judge's denial of
Sanchez's motion to withdra'N his guilty plea. reflect the familiarity of defense counsel with the
law, the facts, and the legal issues presented by Sanchez's case. Further, Sanchez has not
demonstrated the existence of admissible evidence in support of this claim; or that counsel's
performance was objectively deficient; or that he was pr~judiced thereby. Pursuant to I.R.E.
201(6), the court takes judicial notice of the written Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty plea, filed January 28, 2005, and the Mitten Renewed
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed June 20, 2005. The court finds that Petitioner Sanchez
has failed to rais~ ..111 lssue 0f fact c0ncerning trial counsel's handling of his plea of guilty or trial
counsel's handling of Sanchez's two separate motions to withdraw his plea of guilty. The
transcripts and the written documents support a conclusion that defense counsel was prepared,
understood the applicable law. and that he represented the Petitioner competently. Sanchez has
produced no admissible evidence that raises an issue of fact with regard to these matters. The
court agrees with the Stare··s argwnent that Sanchez's claim that trial counsel was ineffective in
the handling of San.::hez· s ·'legal claims" is too vague and conclusory to support an evidentiary
hearing, especiJ.lly when viewed in light of the entire record. Finally, Sanchez's claim that
counsel was inc:lft·i.:tiw in rnnnecti,m with the entry of a guilty plea with "insufficient evidence"
is not supported by the record either. S..111chez raised the issue of the lack of a factual basis for
the entry of his .·l((<vd plea on direct appeal, 'Ahich appeal \Vas denied, and he cannot raise it
again here. fun;itt.

;i-:;

rl.'frrencd above. the :'actaal suppo11 for entry of the guilty plea was
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satisfied by. amung: other things, the .::on tents of the confrontation phone call between Sanchez
and his victim. Defense c:ounsel \Vas ckarly aware of the potential evidentiary impact of that
confrontation call; had no apparent legal justification for excluding evidence concerning that
conversation between Sanchez and his victim: and recognized that the phone call provided a
factual basis for the entry of S:rnchez's guilty plea. Sanchez has raised no issue of fact
concerning any deficient perfom1ance by counsel or any resulting prejudice.
Claim No. 5.
Counsel failed to :idvise tbe Petitioner of:
F)

Adequate notice of the offense;
G) Avaibhte options and pos<;ible consequences;
H) Communicate Government's plea offer and assure the sentence promised;
I) Impact of sentencing guidelines;
J) Serious risk of inability to withdraw plea;
The court finds that Petitioner has raised no issue of deficient performance and/or resulting
prejudice in co11n~el 's failure to advise the Petitioner of the nature of the offense to which he
plead guilty and the po-:sibk~ penalties he was facing. The court record reflects that the court at
different times properly advised Sanchez concerning these matters. Further, the transcript from
the change of plea lK~iring reflects S,mchez's understanding of the nature of the charge and the
possible consequences, as well as the extent of his discussions with counsel concerning the
evidence against him. At that time he also advised the trial judge that he was satisfied with
counsel's representa(il)n. The written record in Sllpport of Sanchez's motion to withdraw bis
plea, together wirh 1he trnnscripts dealing with both the first motion and the renewed motion, as
well as Sanchez's semencing hearing and his stat.:~ments in connection with the pre-sentence
investigation report. reveal the adequacy of his understanding. Nor has Sanchez raised any
material issue\\, ith rr..'S::cml to l'Ounsc:l 's i..ll!eged failure to advise him of "available options and

ORDER 0:\ ST.\.TE'S .WO'rIO.~ FOR SV:'v1..WARY DISMISSAL--17

OD03GC

possible consequen..:cs.'' Again, the aforementioned record belies that contention and Sanchez
has presented no di i'feren t ,)r additional c1dmissib le evidence in support of this claim. Sanchez
likewise has fai!ed to demonstrate any failure in relation to counsel's communication of the
State's plea offer: plead to 1)ne count of Lewd Conduct in exchange for dismissal of the
companion char';es. with open s;;enrencing recommendati0ns. The transcript of the change of
plea hearing, and Sanchez's statements to the trial judge, negate this claim. Sanchez has not
produced any ad:nissible evidence in support of this claim. Sanchez has also alleged defective
performance by counsel in relation to "impact of sentencing guidelines." However, his claim is
not supported by any admissible factual contention concerning failure by counsel in this regard.
The court advised him of the possible consequences and there were no specific sentencing
recommendations agreed to by the parties. Finally, Sanchez has failed to satisfy his burden
concerning his ciairn that counsel 1,vas deficient in failing to advise him concerning the
withdrawal of a guilty plea. The coun advised him of the applicable legal standard. Sanchez
stated that he understc1c,d. Sanci1ez challenged the court's failure to permit withdrawal of his
guilty plea on appeal .md lust. Sanchez bas produced no facts in support of a claim that his trial
counsel's performance wss Jefoctive or that he \vas prejudiced by that performance. Sanchez
was well aware of his right to proceed to jury triaL His plea wasn't entered until the second day
of trial, after the jury bad been selected. Snnchez, faced with the prospect of the jury trial
proceeding that mornin,g and tlic..: charges moving fonvard to\vard a resolution, chose to plead
guilty to one charge i11 exchange for dismissal of two other Lewd Conduct charges, each of
which carried a m:nirnum po~;sible penalty of lile in tbe penitentiary. The transcript of the
change of pka hear;ng r(:1kcts :~ani.:hez's ample understanding of the process and the
thoroughness

nr the ~oitoyu,v.
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Claim Ne,. 6.

Counsd failed to object to hreach of plea;
The court agrees 1,,vith the State that Petitioner Sanchez has failed to present any admissible
evidence in support of this contention, si nee he has not demonstrated that there was any plea
agreement other than the State's dismissal of two Lewd Conduct counts in exchange for a plea to
one count; that there was :my breach of that agreement; or that the~e was any matter to which his
trial counsel should have objected. This claim is frivolous and without any support in the record.
Claim :\o. 7.
Counsel failed to offer evidence at trial;
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to offer evidence at trial is
without support, since there was no jury trial. As stated previously, after the selection of the
jury, on the second day of trial the Petitioner elected to \Vaive his right to jury trial and to plead
guilty to one count of L,~1,,vd Conduct. after having been advised of the rights he was waiving and
after having been alivised of the possible consequences.

That plea was affirmed on appeal.

Counsel had no ohligation to produce evidence at a trial that Petitioner voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently chose to for,=:go. Petitioner· s claim is frivolous.
Claim ~o. 8.
Cuunsd failed to properly object to exclusion of the victim's prior sexual
relati0 11:·. and patre 1·n of lies:
Petitioner's allega:ion ignrJ~S the ·:ourt r·~c0rd in his crimfr1al case. On November 30, 2004,
Sanchez's attorney filed a Motion to Admit Evidence of Past Sexual Behavior Under I.RE. 412,
and a written Mcm,1,·:mclurn in Si!ppnrt of Morio11 \v·as ti!f.~d on December 2, 2004. This motion
was argued and uenitd by the court prior to Sanchez's decision to plead guilty. Pursuant to
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I.R.E. 20l(bJ, this coun taL~s_iudicial norice of tliar motion and the memorandum in support.
Also, Sanchez· s atwmeys pursued the victim's aileged history of untruthfulness by calling three
witnesses to testify in support of the Renewed ~-1otion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and in support of
mitigation at the sentencing hearing.
Claim No. 9.
Counsel failed to object to prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor;
The court agrees vvith Respondent that the Petitioner's claim is too vague and conclusory, and
that he has not identified srecific srntements that were legally objectionable or that his trial
counsel's performarn:e was. objectively ddrt:icnt. Sanchez has also failed to raise a material
issue of fact concerning hew he was prejudiced by counsel's performance in this regard.

l 01.,;--.sd ia.ilcd t0 :;uoject µroscc'uti on' s case to meaningful adverse process;

The court agrees wic~ the Respondent State of Idaho that Petitioner Sanchez has failed to raise a
factual :,ssue reiu,ir.g to hi.s trial connsel's performance in this regard. Under United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 6..iR. l 04 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L. Ed.2d 657 (1984), Sanchez has failed to
demonstrate an issue concerning deficient performance and/or prejudice, since there is no factual
basis proferred in support of ( l J a ''complete denial" of counsel at a critical stage of trial; (2) that
counsel "entirely' fa;!ed tu suD,iect the State's case to "meaningful adversarial testing"; or that

(3) even thougb coun:;d

\V,is

iJVdibble to a.ssist tt,e accukd during trial, the likelihood that any

la\\-yer. even a folly competent one, could provide et1ecti\·e assistance was so small that a
presumption of prei•:dice is aprropriate." The court has previously taken judicial notice,
pursuant to I R. E. 20 l ( b ), of the ,,,,Titten mt)tions and memoranda submitted by counsel on behalf
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of Sanchez ir1 his ciiminai us..:, as \\di as the minutes ufthe court proceedings. The record
supports

a finding that C\.1 unscl haJ identified the issues, was prepared on the facts and the law,

argued zea!ou~l: Lrn behalf of his ,:lient and performed conscientiously. Sanchez has not
1

sustained his burden 10 the <:ontrary.
Claim 1'-Jo. l.L.
Counsel misrepresented the pka agreement;
A review of the coun file c1nd record does not support a finding that there was ever a plea
agreement c,(fr1e:cL o:a,';1[d, or misrcpre~rn~td, ,:,;h:r than 2.llowing Sanchez to plead to one
count only. ALlwugli Petit oner Sanchez asserts that he v,as led to believe that he would only get
five (5) years for t!-i,:: offense, his allegEtion is conclusory and is not supported by the transcript
from the change c,f plea ;,er.ring, the sentencing hearing, and the hearings on Sanchez's attempt
to withdraw his guilty plea.
Claim No._12.:.
Couusel mi::repr-::scnted material facts and withJ-1eld information;
The court agre.:.: s ,\ i~11 ·h,: Res;xmdcnt's argument that Petitioner has failed to produce admissible
factual suppon ·:y:- the ::.\, im

t}·,zt

his attorney misrepresented any "material facts" or withheld

any infornntio·,

Claim No.LL
Counsel induced plea based on:
E) 1'.mbig:uous plea agreement;
i:) Cuen.:10n anJ threats;
(Jj b'rontuu~;Lwlty kpl jJvice;
1 1) 1.:-, ing to Defendant;
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The transcript from 11,e cha'1ge

0f

plea hearing on December 8, 2004, negates any claim that trial

counsel was in,:rt'cct1\·e in its 1ecitmion of an "ambiguous plea agreement," since it is clear from
the record that the Srate ctid net agree to m:ike any particular recommendations and since the trial
judge, in accepting Sanchez's plea, made sure that Sanchez understood the possible penalties and
consequences, as ,vell as the fact that the court was not bound by the recommendations of
counsel and that the court maJe no promises to him. Further, Sanchez had raised on appeal the
claim that he had "telt pressured by his attorney or 'pushed' into entering his guilty plea." The
Court of Appeals rejected his claim, stating, "Sanchez's affidavit reflects nothing more than the
normal stresses and pressuces fi:lt by a criminal defendant pending a serious jury trial-family
concerns, the formal courtroom setting, and the evidence confronting him at trial. This type of
pressure did not constitute a just reason for Sanchez to withdraw his guilty plea," citing State v.

Turner, 95 fdaho .2J6. 207, 5G6 P.2d 103, 104 (1973). State v. Sanchez, Idaho Court of Appeals
2007 Unpublis~1ed Opini0n N(). 593, September 2007. p. 4. With regard to the latter two claims,
Petitioner has failed

lo

demonstrate the existence of admissible factual support for his claims,

which are broad and c0ncl 1.isory.
Claim No. l 4.
Couwcl .::ocrccd Pe:i1iona and subjected him to duress if he did not plead guilty;
:-ud admitted to his own coercion in open court;
Petitioner has LtilcJ to sw,.:J.in bis burden of rnising an issue of fact that is supported by
admissible eviden,::.: Pet;tion,:1· e, press,::d his satisfaction with cdunsel at the time he changed
his plea, and int\1m1.~,~ '.h:~ :ri.1! .·'L,d1:-:" that he •. 1 ·as 1r1t intir:iidated or threatened by anyone. Even
in connection \\'ith hi, att·:mpt t 1) withdraw his guilty plea. Sanchez did not set forth any claimed
facts relating to coer~·ion or dun:::.:s. At the time. Si.lilchez complained that his attorney failed to
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advise him tha! ,1s a 3c,~ offender he might have his picture published in the newspaper (if he
were subsequently clnssilid as a sexual predator), :md that he felt pressured by his attorney, but
no other conduct ,vas alleged. The Court of Appeals rejected his c!aims relating to coercion and
duress, and Sanchez has produced nothing more in support of his claim. Additionally, the court
agrees w·ith the St1te that the re:ord rloes r.ot ~upport Sanchez's claim that his trial attorney had
admitted using coercio;1 in upcn cou11.

Claim No. 15

0

C,}unsd n:rbally a.ssaultcJ Defendant and used threats and racial comments;
Petitioner bas aJducd no ::idmi~sible e\·idence so as to raise u material issue of fact concerning
his claim of :-acial c,:immer,ts or verbal assault. The court has previously addressed Petitioner's
claims that his :n2.l c,;::,u,1sd coerced him.
Claim

:"1 u. i 6.
CounJei failed to imestigate and object to false Presentence Report;

The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that Mr. Sanchez had the opportunity to
challenge the contents of the presentence report and that witnesses were called in support of his
claims that the victin1 \Vas untrustv,orthy and to refute matters contained within the presentence
report. Even though Sanchez's aflidavit set forth allegations that the psychosexual evaluation
was not conducted by Dr. Morgan because Dr. Morgan was deceased, his claim is disproved by
the record hecan:;e it was Ur. Juhn Morgan, still alive, \vho conducted the psychosexual
evaluation. E, 1,;'iJ though 1'lr. \&nci·rez ,v.:is characterized by Dr. Morgan as uncooperative with
the evaluation, it

Whs

(;u11Jud1::d within the evaluator's ability to complete it and Mr. Sanchez

had the opportunity to <.1ddress ic,
Petition,.!r kis L1ikd

.0 111-.t·t

1

JS

\Vdl as the issues it raised, at the time of his sentencing.

h·s burden of producing admissible fm:tual support for his claim
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that the prescntc!l1..\: r,:purt sa~ ·'false," as oppc,sed to disputed by him, or that trial counsel failed
to object to any J.l1e 6ed fahehuoJs.

Claim No. 17.
C)L'.n:,d fr1.iic,j t,) provide udequate assistance at sentencing.

Sanche2 fa:Js to r:,i0e 3.n iss,1e cf tact concerning either defective perfonnance or resulting
prejudice in connection \vith trial counsel's representation of him at his sentencing hearing, so as
to satisfy the Srrick!cmd stsndard. The transcript from the sentencing hearing reflects that
defense counsel conJucted cross-examination of the State's witnesses and called five witnesses
to testify on behalf of the Petitioner. Counsel for Sanchez argued against the State's
recommendations and in support of Sanchez, referring to facts in the record and challenging the
reliability and truthfulnes~~ of the victim. Sanchez does not produce admissible factual support
for his claim thJr trial counsel ·s representation was in any way inadequate.
3)

Inat!equate Counsel Claims "Caused by the Court"

Petitioner Sanci1ez makes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as caused by the court:
A) Imerfrn:nce w:ih defense witnesses;
Sanchez's claim is 11,Lgce ~nd c·.mclusory. is not identified sufficiently, and is not supported by
admissib:e e ·i.i(..:-i.
1

1: .

Dcf.::us-: >J,m::r.:l i.Je11tified "ltn.::.;.<,es, c!i.-,closed potential witnesses in

discovi:ty. J .:G1._,:istrntcd aa
1

~i.'.'i 1.for~tanding

of ·.vbJt their testimony would be (relating to the

victim's allegd ~,ri,)r s;:xc•,l, <.:vLciuc~, allege<l untruthfulness, and problems at school), and
argued in support ui" t;ie pnsnions t11at Sa.ncna took. Sanchez has consequently failed to meet
his burden.
8) Failed to i!14uin: in10 reasons \VhY Defendant requested substitute counsel;
Petitioner has failed to dl?mnn-;trate any admi~sible facts in support of a contention that somehow
defense counsel was indf1~l:!ive in repre:-1;nting him on his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. The
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trial judge hc1J :nqtdr,~d t1f S.:-c11chez \\fo:thcr he· wished to be ;-epresented by his trial counsel on
the motion or by himself prose. Trial counsel advised that Sanchez had inquired of another
attorney, \Vhn w(;uld :iced
Callahan, the Gem

J

Cl;L;nty

re winer- and that Sanchez had already previously contacted Nancy

Public Dc.,fer,der at that time, and that Sanchez felt that he did not

have a good rap,:,0rr ,vith h':'r 2rct that she di-:! ·1ot "like" the case. Thus, Sanchez was aware of
the potential conflict hut chose to proceed, in part because the State might seek to revoke his
bond. The transcript of the motion hearing on Febmary 7, 2005, reflects that trial counsel
thoroughly argued Mr. Sarichez's motion, including suggesting some personal responsibility for
matters that, based on the record, did not appear ro be attributable to him. In other words, Mr.
Sanchez has not made am shov,ing of how he was hampered by counsel's argument, and
Sanchez certainly was aware of his choices in seeking to have other counsel represent him at that
point in time.
C)

Coq_rJJS_fus_ed to al low Defendant to_be present for an in camera hearing;

The court agre1:s that Pditit111cr has provided no admissible factual support regarding any in

camera hearing; thht lie had a right to be presl:nt; or that rhe court is responsible in some way for
the ineftective assistrn1ee ,)f cow1sel. Pc:titicner fails to meet his burden.
D) RefuseJ t0 allo·.v evidence of victim's behavior and related actions constituting lies
.lrid rabr: .:,.~:,n1 ·/·- ~ct:usJti,1113 ·ow;d_authoritics.

Petitioner fails re

,kr:•0n:, 1 r:tte

ri,.,w bis CO!l!1c:el

respond)ility. Pe'.i;i 'W.:·r's tri1I att0mey file-d
Rule 41.?. L ~

t:.

r; \::;,·,

5.

~

1

vas ineffrctive and how it was the court's

motion ~eeking w ;:idmit evidence pursuant to

r,, th.: i il:iin1'~ IJI~or sel<.ual history. which motion was denied by the

court. P~tition:::r :ouk 1w 3ppc"al lrom that ruling and has not demonstrated how the court's
denial of the rnoti,;n was ,·:Tu.
witnesses cerU1in inJ1v1duals

rrial co .m:;d also

wi·.o

1

idenrified and had disclosed as potential trial

,,•oula testity concerning the victim's behavior and alleged

untruthfulness. Tr-ia! co1Jnsel \\ ent on to call certain of those witnesses in support of Sanchez's
Renewed rvtnticn 1 c \\'ithdran Guilty Plea and as mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing.
Petitioner !ins failed

[d tnfi.='

h;s burden.

4) lneff>cth'e Co1111sd-C/aims 'tgainst Appellate Counsel
A) A.pp,?liate coun.qel failed to raise:

1)

I he rnc:ritorious issues stated abm·e;

Petitioner :;anci1ez ims faikd lo raencify with sufficient particularity the "meritorious" appeal
issues that 2ppt'l!utt:: co 1:1sd alle'.;~'.Jly failed tu ircludt>. He has not produced admissible
1

evidence :n ::;upi1ort c.f /iis, :::.i.Tt c;1d apr,ellate rnur:sel's performance was objectively deficient
and/or that Sanchez was prejudiced thereby. He has failed to raise a question of fact concerning
the existence of any meritorious issues that were not raised .
..:.;

l.1bvious i::isue·, on ap;.,ea1:

Petitioner Sanchez h,1s foiled to identify the "cbvious issues on appeal" that were not raised and
has failed to raise an iss11e Dffoct coricerning the performance of appellate counsel in this regard
and/or the alleged
3)
Although Sam:ha

pre:i udice that he suffered.
f 11<~ff~.?c· i ve as::'istance
nD'v\

0f counsel:

cvmpiains about the r,;::presentation of his primary trial counsel, he fails

to identify ,vltl1 ar,y r;:Jrti-:_i;,tfilY the alieged ineffectiveness that could have been raised on a
direct apperl ;';; :he Cr,un of' ·\rpc.:::tls noted in Stater. Saxon. 133 Idaho 546, 989 P.2d 288
(Ct.Apr. I 99~l), ,Ji~.;:· J i •;:-.L v\ o, '.n,. J~ct i I e t~s;:,tancc of coun ;d on direct appeal genera!ly is
disadvantag..::ous tu a Jdi~n .Lm hevuuse ,;ii! cwnpe'.em.:y of counsel is not an issue in a criminal
trial and c011sequc::r:tl), 1/1e· t .::.d iecor,J on direct rtppeal is rarely sufficient for review of such
claims. l'etitiorrn In; pP:d-.Kvd n,) ,i.'rni:,'.ithk evidence to support his claim that appellate
counsel ,vu~:~, ffrc1i· e
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[n r·c·,:i J (:c>·,1 i :~~ion of false evidence and testimony;

Petitioner has failed

t,1

id'2ntif:: what his contentions are relating to the admission of "false

evidence and testimory" by appellate counsel. who live with the record created in the trial court
and raise issues :md :i,.gunwnts h'.lsed on \\h:1t has or has not been presented at that level.
Sanchez has not me, his hurden of demonstrating the existence of admissible evidence to support
this claim that his arpellate counsd's performance was objectively defective and/or that he was
prejudiced thereby
S)

Pror,::r1 1 argue facts anJ law surrounding Appellant's federal constitutional
nght u ,vitlldrnw plea \\·hen ass:-n:ing coercion and actual innocence, and
sut)[nitti11g Lk facts \\hic:1 \~ere provided;

The court agrees with the State that Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden on producing
admissible evidence to support this claim. Specifically, as the State points out, Sanchez does not
allege that he ever coillJ1Jt111icAc.J r11 Jppellztte coun:d his desires corn::eming the assertion of
these claims: that appel!ate coJ.nsel disregarded or ignored his desires; or that appellate counsel
did not competeJJtly evaluate :be record from the trial court and identify issues supported by the
record. The issLes ,u:rourding \Vi1hJra ,va1 ,Jf Sanchez's guilty plea were vigorously argued in
the trial court on l\Vu uccac,Gns. and wen: thoroughly presented on appeal, including the issue of
Sanchez's claim of actual lnnocence and the effect of his Alford plea as it related to his desire to
withdraw his g 1 nity plea.

5)

Claims of l'lt.1 htions of State and Fedaal Constitutional Rights

Petitioner S.1rH.:hc.<'. claims vi0!at10ns nf his state and federal constitutional rights to:
A) Due process;
8) ~ qiud ;:irc'.tr:crion
C) G11~1r;:nr..:~'

U) \li,-1: .. ·0

ORDER
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or La\\':

nr rr ·c,.·.:;s,', of th~ cn11rt in cri111i:1al :ictions;

1 , ) . · : · : • .,

•

1.!.t!'d,n.::::l

·isiit

l:) c.:'.~ 1:rt

h;~ ii",.:cc:·.ct :.md facts;
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f) Right to justice and speedy remedy without ad,erse actions against his person, rights
;:no !ib::·l/ i1,U..i.':,l.

The Respo:ident's .viution to Dismiss sets forth the inadequacies of the record that Sanchez has
produced in st:~TOrl ( ,f t'l\.'.',·.:' c 1,iirn:;. He ha::-- failed to identify any failure or inadequacy of the
process that he r,.=cei,,,:l~ in c•:-rnection with t'"le prc·scr 1tiot1 of his criminal case. He has failed to
1

allege or submit any factual support for his claim that his equal protection rights have been
violated. He has foiL:d to icitntit)· any "right to justice and speedy remedy" that has been
violated, and how it has been allegedly violated. Further. he has not set forth any factual support
for a claim of violation of right to <;pee<ly triaL and none exists in the record. Also, even if such
issues existed, there is no showing of why they could not have been raised on his direct appeal.
Finally, the issue of Petitic,ner's claim of actual innocence was raised in connection with his
direct appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support a fi!lding ut' hcmai guilt und den;ed Sanchez any relief from the entry of his guilty plea
based on his claim of v..:tual innocence.
COlv'CLUSIO,V

Despite the ,·,_:;llln'.tr,uus submissicjrts by Ni::-stor Sa.nchez, a careful review of his affidavits
reveals that he has failed

i:Ci

demonstrate the existence of admissible evidence to support his

claims so as to ,ai:;c. a :m11cria: issue of fact 1.h:.ic would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on
any of his clairi,s. Pur::;uJ.nt to ;J2ho Code Section l 9-.+906(c), a11er considering the pleadings,

the transcripts, the 11ffid;1vit-.. :ind the rec,)rd-; of whii::h this court has taken judicial notice, the
court concludes ,h,,t r!Je St:ite is entitled tu judgment as a matter of law.
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On the grounds and for the reasons stated, the Respondent State of Idaho's Motion for

Summary Dismissal is hereby granted and Nestor Sanchez's post-conviction petition is
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this - - ~ day of October,
20 l l.

cJjjj~(l~
Jeaic.ierrick
istrict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded to
the following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

Mr. Casey Swensen
Mimura Law Office PLLC
Gem Cm.:nty Puhlic Defender
310 East Main Street

Emmett. Ide>ho 83617

Mr. Timothy McNeese
Gem County Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box 67 !
306 East Main Str~et
Emmett,. Idaho W36l 7
Nestor Sanchez
IDOC #78322

I.C.C.
V-17-B
P.O. Box 7001 ()
Boise, Idaho 8n07

Idaho Department of Correction
Records Department
1299 North Orchard, Suite 1 IO
Boise, Idahu 8J 706

Dated this

____
{_Q _ d a y of

~b

, 2011.

SHELLY GANNON

Clerk of the Court
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